MITRE ATT&CK Technique
Defense Evasion T1562.002
Description

Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol) Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the <code>Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped</code> or <code>sc config eventlog start=disabled</code> commands (followed by manually stopping the service using <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>).(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging)(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the “Start” value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog</code> then restarting the system for the change to take effect.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) There are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the "Start" value in the key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Security</code>, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog.(Citation: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter) Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-System</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application</code> to disable the entire EventLog.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) Additionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.

Supported Platforms
Windows
Created

April 29, 2026

Last Updated

April 29, 2026

STIX Data
{'created': '2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z',
 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',
 'description': 'Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data '
                'that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows '
                'event logs record user and system activity such as login '
                'attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows '
                'Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts '
                'to generate detections.\n'
                '\n'
                'The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system '
                'components and applications.(Citation: '
                'EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service '
                'automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit '
                'policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), '
                'defines which system events the EventLog service logs. '
                'Security audit policy settings can be changed by running '
                'secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\\Local '
                'Policies\\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings '
                'or <code>Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy '
                'Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy '
                'settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: '
                'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>auditpol.exe</code> '
                'may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)\n'
                '\n'
                'Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a '
                'particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog '
                'service may be disabled using the <code>Set-Service -Name '
                'EventLog -Status Stopped</code> or <code>sc config eventlog '
                'start=disabled</code> commands (followed by manually stopping '
                'the service using <code>Stop-Service  -Name '
                'EventLog</code>).(Citation: '
                'Disable_Win_Event_Logging)(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) '
                'Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the '
                '“Start” value in '
                '<code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog</code> '
                'then restarting the system for the change to take '
                'effect.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)\n'
                '\n'
                'There are several ways to disable the EventLog service via '
                'registry key modification. First, without Administrator '
                'privileges, adversaries may modify the "Start" value in the '
                'key '
                '<code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Security</code>, '
                'then reboot the system to disable the Security '
                'EventLog.(Citation: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter) '
                'Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify '
                'the same values in '
                '<code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-System</code> '
                'and '
                '<code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Application</code> '
                'to disable the entire EventLog.(Citation: '
                'disable_win_evt_logging)\n'
                '\n'
                'Additionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and '
                'its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or '
                'clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified '
                'setting or audit category, adversaries may use the '
                '<code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. '
                'For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” '
                '/success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing '
                'for the Account Logon category.(Citation: '
                'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To '
                'clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following '
                'lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol '
                '/remove /allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)\n'
                '\n'
                'By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate '
                'while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.',
 'external_references': [{'external_id': 'T1562.002',
                          'source_name': 'mitre-attack',
                          'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002'},
                         {'description': ' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows '
                                         'Event Logging. Retrieved September '
                                         '10, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'Disable_Win_Event_Logging',
                          'url': 'https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'},
                         {'description': 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). '
                                         'Defense Evasion: Windows Event '
                                         'Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved '
                                         'September 14, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'def_ev_win_event_logging',
                          'url': 'https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'},
                         {'description': 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). '
                                         'Essential Windows Services: EventLog '
                                         '/ Windows Event Log. Retrieved '
                                         'September 14, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'EventLog_Core_Technologies',
                          'url': 'https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'},
                         {'description': 'Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). '
                                         'Audit Policy. Retrieved September '
                                         '13, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'Audit_Policy_Microsoft',
                          'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'},
                         {'description': 'Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows '
                                         'Security Log Events. Retrieved '
                                         'February 21, 2020.',
                          'source_name': 'Windows Log Events',
                          'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/'},
                         {'description': 'Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: '
                                         'Disable Windows Event Logging. '
                                         'Retrieved April 7, 2022.',
                          'source_name': 'disable_win_evt_logging',
                          'url': 'https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25'},
                         {'description': 'Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October '
                                         '16). auditpol. Retrieved September '
                                         '1, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'auditpol',
                          'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'},
                         {'description': 'Naceri, A. (2021, November 7). '
                                         'Windows Server 2019 file overwrite '
                                         'bug. Retrieved April 7, 2022.',
                          'source_name': 'winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter',
                          'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20211107115646/https://twitter.com/klinix5/status/1457316029114327040'},
                         {'description': 'redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). '
                                         'T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event '
                                         'Logging. Retrieved September 13, '
                                         '2021.',
                          'source_name': 'T1562.002_redcanaryco',
                          'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'},
                         {'description': 'Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). '
                                         'Advanced security audit policy '
                                         'settings. Retrieved September 14, '
                                         '2021.',
                          'source_name': 'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings',
                          'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'},
                         {'description': 'STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. '
                                         'Retrieved September 9, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC',
                          'url': 'https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'},
                         {'description': 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event '
                                         'Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the '
                                         'EventLog Service. Retrieved '
                                         'September 14, 2021.',
                          'source_name': 'evt_log_tampering',
                          'url': 'https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c'}],
 'id': 'attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a',
 'kill_chain_phases': [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack',
                        'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}],
 'modified': '2025-10-24T17:48:45.425Z',
 'name': 'Disable Windows Event Logging',
 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],
 'revoked': False,
 'spec_version': '2.1',
 'type': 'attack-pattern',
 'x_mitre_attack_spec_version': '3.2.0',
 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection '
                          '(CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team',
                          'Lucas Heiligenstein'],
 'x_mitre_deprecated': False,
 'x_mitre_detection': '',
 'x_mitre_domains': ['enterprise-attack'],
 'x_mitre_is_subtechnique': True,
 'x_mitre_modified_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',
 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows'],
 'x_mitre_version': '1.4'}
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